Introduction
What is the effect of warfare on the environment of a summarizes the findings of previous research. Following that, we outline statistical models, address design issues, and present the empirical results. Finally, we summarize our findings, sug gest future research, and discuss implications.
Theoretical arguments and extant empirical evidence
Armed forces may destroy their own environment, or the opposition's, as a strategy to win the war. For example, forests may be destroyed to deny timber or hiding places, and oil wells, freshwater, crops, land, and animals may be damaged to prevent their use by a foe. Both sides may intensify the exploitation of their own resources or the commandeered resources of the other side (e.g. Westing, 1980 Westing, , 1990 Biswas, 2000) . Damages may also be indirect: troop movement may degrade arable land and vegetation; fighting and arms produc tion may increase pollution and waste; provisions for troops may intensify pressures on resources; norms in favor of envi ronmental protection may deteriorate; and war refugees may dump waste and damage ecosystems in pursuit of food, land, and firewood (e.g. Dasgupta, 1995; McNeill, 2001) .
Conversely, war may reduce ordinary activities that harm the environment. For example, industrial facilities and motor vehicles may be destroyed, reducing production and transpor tation and, therefore, the associated pollution and waste. Indir ectly, a rise in fish stocks could occur if fewer fishing boats go to sea because fishermen are enlisted or avoid combat loca tions. Biodiversity may increase as the military often designates some zones as 'off limits' to people. As more fossil fuels are shipped to the front and more laborers are enlisted in the mil itary, ordinary economic activities may decline, reducing envi ronmental pressure, emissions, and waste (e.g. Westing, 1980; McNeely, 2000; Tucker, 2004) .1
Empirically, most case studies find negative effects. For example, the French war in Morocco in the 1920s, the US war in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and the Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980s destroyed forests (Westing, 1980; McNeill, 1992 McNeill, , 2001 . Wars in Myanmar and Cambodia (Jarvie et al., 2003) and Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Baker et al., 2003) intensified deforestation. In World War II (WWII), military forces damaged desert-crusts, which intensified sandstorms, and employed scorched-earth policies (Aarsten, 1946; Sobolev, 1947; El-Shobokshy & Al-Saedi, 1993; Clout, 1996) . Data presented by Smil (1990: 427) indicate that the annual rate of release of emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels fell in the USA during the deep depression and rose after 1940, as industrial activity inten sified during WWII. Dikes and dams were destroyed during the Japan-China War , WWII, and the Korean War, flooding arable land (McNeill, 2001; Biswas, 2000; Westing, 1977) . Wars in the LDCs eroded the norms and institutions focusing on environmental preservation (Deacon, 1994) . The 1991 Gulf War involved oil spills and setting oil wells on fire (Hawley, 1992) . Refugees degraded the environment around their camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Malawi, and Sudan (Allan, 1987; Jacobsen, 1997) . Positive effects are also observed. For example, during WWII fish stocks increased in the Atlantic Ocean and wild animal stocks grew in Norway and Guam, as fishing and hunt ing decreased (Westing, 1980) . Houghton & Skole (1990: 398) indicate that the global annual release of carbon emis sions from the combustion of fossil fuels (of which a large part is C02) declined during WWI and WWII. Smil (1990: 427) indicates that the growth rate of the global annual release of NOx emissions from fossil fuel combustion declined during WWII compared to the 1920s/early 1930s and the 1950s.
In Finland, WWII reduced natural resource extraction, waste, and polluting emissions (Laakkonen, 2004) . Explosives left in the Kuwaiti desert after the 1991 Gulf War kept hunters and joy-riders away, increasing vegetation and animal stocks (Pilcher, 1993) .
Finally, we need to consider three additional theoretical issues. The first concerns the location of actual fighting. Finally, different environmental aspects may be more or less sensitive to warfare. Some case studies support this idea, reporting that war may even benefit some environmental attri butes while harming others. Table I summarizes the compet ing effects. Though their sizes are not known theoretically, their overall effect can be studied statistically. problems such as local pollution. This is not a concern here, as we measure greenhouse gases at the country (local) level, not at the global level. 3 Descriptive statistics are in the Appendix. Other indicators can be studied, but given the scope and complexity of our analysis, they are better addressed in a separate study.
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The World Resources Institute (1999) forest data come from FAO (1995 FAO ( , 1997 , 2006; Panayotou, 2000) , we also include the following independent variables: real GDP per capita (GDP/cap), GDP/cap squared, GDP/cap cubed (in some models), trade openness, level of democracy, population den sity, and initial forest area (in forest change models).8
Our democracy measure indicates the level of democracy in a country based on the POLITY IV dataset (Marshall & Jaggers, 2006) . Our measure is computed as the difference between the democracy (DEMOC) and autocracy (AUTOC)
indices in this dataset. The 10-point DEMOC measures the democratic attributes of the regime, and the 10-point AUTOC measures the autocratic attributes. The resulting measure ranges between -10 (most autocratic) and +10 (most democratic). This measure is widely used in the literature (e.g. , 1996; Li & Reuveny, 2003 , 2006 . As discussed in Li & Reuveny (2006) , the effect of democracy on the environment is debated.
Londregan & Poole
GDP/cap and its squared term are included to account for the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). Studies hypothesize that a rise in GDP/cap increases environmental degradation until GDP/cap reaches a certain threshold. Once GDP/cap rises above this threshold, the degradation declines, since richer people demand more environmental quality. The hypothesis is intuitively appealing, but its empirical validity is debated.9 The GDP/cap data, expressed in constant 1996 dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity differences across countries (international dollars [1$]), come from the Penn World country exporting and importing goods whose production and consumption, respectively, damage the environment will see its environmental quality decline, while its trade partner will see its environmental quality improve, ceteris paribus. Trade openness is also said to promote economic growth, though the effect on the environment is debated in the literature. The data come from the Penn World Table 6 .1 (Heston, Summers &:
Population density is the population of a country divided by its area. More densely populated countries may demand more resources and generate more pollution and waste. How ever, they may also be more urbanized, depend less on the environment for livelihood, and have better public transporta tion and shorter driving distances, leading to reduced pressures on the environment (e.g. Templeton & Scherr, 1999; Panayo tou, 2000) . The data come from WDI (2002). Initial forest area indicates the forest area of a country in the first time period of our sample. This variable is included since the rate of change could be higher in countries with small for ests than in countries with large forests. Countries with small forests can also experience large changes in rates of forest change, as small absolute changes can lead to relatively larger rates. One solution to this potential problem is to control for the initial forest size. The data come from the sources listed above for the rate of forest change.11
Design issues
In designing our analysis, we need to consider several technical issues. The first issue is whether to conduct a pooled time series cross-sectional analysis, or a cross-sectional analysis. Our choice is dictated by data availability. The C02 sample covers 134 countries annually from 1961 to 1997. The NOx sample covers 128 countries with annual data for two years (1990, 1995 it does not matter if they display EKC at home. We thank an anonymous referee for this comment. Our models work at the national, not global level.
To the extent that the EKC affects degradation at home, it needs to be in our models.
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We thank a reviewer for suggesting adding this variable. 12
The countries in the samples are reported in the Appendix.
forest change indicator is a rate computed as (area, areali) / areali, and the stress reduction indicator controls for country size differences pertaining to its components).
Additionally, there is the concern of path dependence in For C02 emissions, we need to consider the possibility that our models miss some structural variables (e.g. climate) and as such may be subject to some possible omitted variable bias.
The inclusion of the LDV accounts for some of the omitted variable bias (e.g. Li & Reuveny, 2003 , 2006 . We further guard against this possibility by using the country-fixed effects estimator, controlling for country-specific features not included, and by using a yearly counter to account for the pos sible trend of C02 emissions since the economy is growing.
While these features make it harder for us to find statistically significant effects, we prefer to err on the side of caution.14 Another issue is that the effects of the independent variables on our environmental indicators may not be immediate, and some of our right-hand side variables may be affected by the dependent variable (e.g. emissions may correlate with environmental laws that affect GDP/cap). Many scholars lag the right-hand variables one period, and we will do so as well for the C02, , and environmental stress reduction models.15 We also need to consider multicollinearity and, for C02, gesting reasonably good fit.16 The individual VIFs are below 8.5 for C02, and 2 for forest change, emissions, and environmental stress reduction, except for GDP/cap and its square term, for which they are larger than 10 (this cannot be helped when modeling the EKC). Thus, multicollinearity is essentially not a concern. The correlation matrices (see Appendix Tables XII-A Lagged C02
Year The results indicate the existence of an EKC with a turning point of 12,945 real 1$ for the DCs, and 20,000 real 1$ for the LDCs.20
Forest change
The structure of Table III follows that of Table II , except there are no results for the DCs because the sample size is too small (17 observations) to produce meaningful results. In Model Dl for the all-countries sample, the effect of armed conflict at home or abroad on forest change is negative and significant, intensifying deforestation. Model D2 shows the negative effect is driven by armed conflict at home; the coefficient of conflict abroad is insignificant. Armed conflicts at home destroy forests and/or intensify logging and forest clearing. For the LDCs, Model D3 indicates the effect of armed conflict at home or abroad is negative and significant, intensifying deforestation.
Model D4 shows that armed conflict fought in LDCs intensifies deforestation, as before, but armed conflict fought abroad pro motes forest growth. For the LDCs, conflict abroad diverts labor and finances away from timber logging and forest clearing.
Consider next the sizes of the significant effects of warfare on deforestation. Using the approach outlined above, Model D2 for the all-countries sample suggests that armed conflict at home changes the annual rate of deforestation by 300%, from about -0.2% to -0.8% when conflict changes from 0 to 1. Model D4 for the LDCs shows that armed conflict at home changes the annual rate of deforestation by 300%, from about -0.25% to -1%, whereas armed conflict abroad changes the rate of refor estation by about 200%, from -0.25% to 0.29%. These effects are much larger than that recommended by the Global Moni toring Report (2007) , which argues that the appropriate forest policy goal for most countries is a zero rate of deforestation. Strand et al., 2005; Gleditsch et al., 2002) . In general, the results resemble those in Tables II-V but are less significant in some cases since there are consider ably fewer wars than armed conflicts in our samples. In Appen dix Table I -A, war generally reduces C02 emissions, as before.
In Appendix Table II Second, the existence of the EKC is an empirical issue, and the dependence of environmental degradation on GDP/cap may be cubic. Adding GDP/cap cubed to our models, the results for armed conflict and the controls resemble those in Tables II-V effect, largely driven by the LDCs (Appendix Table VIII-A) ; stress reduction rises with GDP/cap until 5,000 1$, falls to 0 around 10,000 1$, stays 0 until 156,000 1$, and then rises with GDP/cap.23
Third, the C02 emissions models in Table II Table II , except that now the negative effect of armed conflict at home for the LDCs is significant, and the negative effect for the DCs is insignificant, and the effects of the control variables are generally more significant, which is to be expected. The sizes of the effects of conflict are now con siderably larger than the sizes of effects in the presence of the LDV term, which is also to be expected.
Fourth, we re-estimate the forest change model, adding an interaction term between forest area and real GDP per capita, as in Ewers (2006) which is interpreted as 0, as the index itself is between 0 (no stress reduction) and 100 (maximum reduction). 24 IVPROBIT accounts for their endogeneity by using proper instrumentsthe variables in our warfare, and stress or forest models, respectively. The warfare variables are often used (e.g. GDP/cap, population size/growth, mountainous area share, trade openness, political instability, democracy).
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To our knowledge, our result that conflict abroad reduces deforestation at home is new to the literature. on the environment could be studied based on initiator vs. tar get countries or the impacts of different economic sectors.
Discussing the implications of our findings needs to be done cautiously, as they are based on a first study. The effects of warfare on the national economy, global economy, political development, and public health have been widely studied in the social sciences. The impact of warfare on the environment, in contrast, has received too little attention. This situation may change as environmental issues will probably acquire growing salience in the public discourse in the coming decades. Our study also contributes to the literature on the consequences of warfare by providing some generalizable statistical evidence on environmental impacts.
In considering the relevance of our research for policymak ing, one may take a positive or negative perspective. Do leaders consider the environment in their decisions over the use of force? If the expected substantive effects are small, leaders will probably ignore them. If they are large, they might still be overshadowed by traditional national security-related consid erations, but they may not be completely ignored. Indeed, many countries have signed treaties that impose environmen tal constraints on the conduct of war, and army manuals in countries like the USA instruct avoiding environmental dam age, as far as military goals permit (Westing, 2000) . This is consistent with our findings that the substantive effects of war fare on the environment are quite large. Thus, environmental considerations could play some, though not the most impor tant, role in the decisions to use force.
Should leaders consider the negative environmental effects in their decisions on the use of force? Their decision likely reflects a cost-benefit analysis of expected gains (e.g. acquire resources) and expected costs (e.g. casualties). We find that warfare significantly harms some aspects of the environment.
To the extent that these effects reduce human welfare, we believe they should be considered in decisions over the use of force. Doing so may tip the cost-benefit analysis in favor of attempting to resolve disputes peacefully. 
Data replication
The data are at http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets. The analysis utilized Stata8.
